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Hare: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I. THE DEATH PENALTY
In State v. Goolsby,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a conviction for murder2 but reversed the defendant's death
sentence because the trial judge failed to give a necessary jury
instruction.3 The court further held that the exclusion of certain
jurors for cause because of their beliefs about capital punishment violated neither the due process standard established by
4
the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois
nor the South Carolina Death Penalty Act.5 The court in
Goolsby elaborated on South Carolina standards governing both
jury instructions for the punishment phase of a bifurcated capital trial and the exclusion of potential jurors for cause. 6

1. - S.C. -, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980). Goolsby was the fourth case decided by the
South Carolina Supreme Court under the 1977 South Carolina Death Penalty Act. The
other cases are State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979); State v. Tyner, 273
S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
Although State v. Smart, 274 S.C. 303, 262 S.E.2d 911 (1980), also addressed issues arising out of a charge of murder, Smart was an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial order.
2. Goolsby was indicted by a Greenwood County grand jury May 15, 1978. Record,
vol. 4, at 1521. The aggravating circumstance found by the jury, which was a prerequisite
to a recommendation of death under S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(Supp. 1980), was
that Goolsby had a prior record of conviction for murder.
3. - S.C. at , 268 S.E.2d at 40-41. Because of the court's action in reversing and
remanding the death sentence, the state is required to holal a new sentencing proceeding
if the appellant is to be sentenced to death a second time. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-325(E)(2) (Supp. 1980).
4. 391 U.S. 510 (1967).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10 to -40 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B)(Supp. 1980) provides that "[u]pon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment." For a discussion of the court's earlier cases dealing with exclusion of
jurors for cause in a capital case and instructions to jurors during the guilt determination
phase of trial, see CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 32 S.C.L. REV.
81, 93-100 (1980).
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Jury Instructions for the Punishment Phase of a
Bifurcated Capital Trial

Because of the finality of the death penalty7 and because of
the unique role of the jury in deciding whether the ultimate penalty should be imposed,8 the South Carolina Supreme Court has
carefully scrutinized jury instructions in capital trials for prejudicial error.9 The court's continuing concern with instructions in
capital trials is reflected in Goolsby where, as in State v. Tyner,10 a 1979 decision under the current Death Penalty Act,11 it
sought to correct the omission of an instruction to the jury explaining the jury's discretionary power to recommend life imprisonment even if they were to find aggravating circumstances. 12 The court found this omission sufficiently prejudicial
to require that the death1 3sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing
In both Goolsby and Tyner, the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court in
Spivey v. State1 4 and Fleming v. State.1 5 In Spivey, the Georgia
7. See State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 700, 258 S.E.2d 890, 896 (1979); State v.
Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 274-75, 122 S.E.2d 622, 630 (1961).
8. See 391 U.S. at 519 n.15; State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. at 659, 258 S.E.2d at 566.
9. See State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. at 659, 258 S.E.2d at 566; State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C.
at 697-98, 258 S.E.2d at 896; State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. at 274-75, 122 S.E.2d at 630.
Tyner was the only one of these cases in which the court found error in jury instructions.
The error in Gilbert was that the solicitor argued improperly; in Sharpe, the trial judge
allowed photographers to take pictures during the trial.
10. 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979). The court in Tyner specifically stated that
the omission of a necessary instruction was an "arbitrary" factor under S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-25(C)(1) (Supp. 1980).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10 to -40 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
12. Under S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(Supp. 1980), the jury must consider both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death or life imprisonment. Before a defendant can be sentenced to death at
least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in this section must be found beyond a
reasonable doubt.
13. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 40-41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(E)(2)(Supp. 1980)
provides specific guidelines for a resentencing proceeding.
14. 241 Ga. 477, 246 S.E.2d 288 (1978). South Carolina's death penalty statute is
modeled after the Georgia statute upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Because of the similarity of the
two statutes, the South Carolina Supreme Court often looks to the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court for assistance in the interpretation and application of the statute.
E.g., State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. at 698, 258 S.E.2d at 894; State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. at 660,
258 S.E.2d at 566.
15. 243 Ga. 120, 252 S.E.2d 609 (1979). Later, similar decisions of the Georgia court
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court stated that the test for determining whether a jury charge
has sufficiently informed the jury of its discretion to recommend
life imprisonment "is whether a reasonable juror, considering
the charge as a whole, would know that, . . . even though he
might find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances to exist,. . . he might recommend life imprisonment."' 16
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not adopt this
explicit language and merely referred to Spivey and Fleming,1 7
its tendency to rely on decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court
suggests the probability of eventual express adoption of the
standard.
Goolsby, Tyner, and other recent decisions 18 indicate that
the court will continue to scrutinize closely jury instructions in
capital cases. The court clearly intends to ensure that jurors are
adequately informed of the full range of their discretion and of
their responsibility to "express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death."1 9
B. Jury Selection Standards
1. The Witherspoon Standard.-In addition to his argument on appeal that the trial judge had failed to adequately instruct the jury during the punishment phase of his trial, Goolsby
urged that the trial judge, by excluding jurors for cause because
of their beliefs about capital punishment, had violated a due
process standard established by the United States Supreme
Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois.2 0 As a result, Goolsby argued,
the jury that sentenced him was biased against him on the issue
drawn from a
of the punishment he should receive2" and was not
22
community.
the
of
section
cross
representative

include Mulligan v. State, 245 Ga. 266, 264 S.E.2d 204 (1980), and Harris v. Hopper, 243
Ga. 244, 253 S.E.2d 707 (1979).
16. 241 Ga. at 481, 246 S.E.2d at 291.
268 S.E.2d at 40-41.
S.C. at -,
17. 18. See note 9 supra.
19. 391 U.S. at 519. Only a few other jurisdictions have considered the narrow issue
posed in Goolsby. Compare Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978)

and Woodard v. State, 270 Ark. 679, 553 S.W.2d 259 (1977) with State v. Lindsey,
W.Va.

-,

-

233 S.E.2d 734 (1977).

20. 391 U.S. at 510. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
21. Brief of Appellant at 9-10.

22. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 35; Brief of Appellant at 8-10. Although Goolsby
argued on appeal that the exclusion of jurors because of their beliefs regarding capital
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The petitioner in Witherspoon appealed from a capital trial
in Illinois state court in which forty-seven veniremen had been
excluded for cause on the basis of their attitudes toward the
death penalty. Only five of the forty-seven had stated expressly
that they would not consider voting for the death penalty under
any circumstances.28 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
Witherspoon's conviction but reversed his sentence, stating that,
"in its role of arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury
fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner
'
was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2
Before Witherspoon, state courts often held that jurors who
expressed religious or conscientious scruples against capital punishment could be excluded for cause from the jury in a capital
case regardless of whether they stated'that such scruples would
substantially hinder their ability to carry out their duties as jurors. 28 After Witherspoon, the only jurors who could constitutionally be excluded from the jury in a capital case because of
their scruples against the death penalty were those
who made unmistakeably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial
of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from
making an impartial
26
decision as to the defendant's guilt.

punishment denied him a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community, Goolsby's reliance on Witherspoon to support this position was misplaced. Witherspoon does contain several references to the importance of juries as reflectors of community values; the Witherspoon decision, however, is based on the right to a fundamentally
fair trial found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the right to
trial by an impartial jury found in the sixth amendment. See 391 U.S. at 518-23; Hovey
v. Superior Court, - Cal. 3d , , , 619 P.2d 1301, 1304 n.17, 1308 n.38, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128, 131 n.17, 135-36 n.38 (1980).
The right to be tried by a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the
community has been established by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). The record in Goolsby's case indicates that he could not
have met the proof requirements of these two cases even if his position had been properly argued before the court.
23. 391 U.S. at 514.
24. Id. at 518.
25. 391 U.S. at 513-14 n.5. The following South Carolina cases decided before
Witherspoon discuss the issue of disqualification of a juror because of his views concerning capital punishment- State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 147 S.E. 441 (1929); State v.
Hyde, 90 S.C. 296, 73 S.E. 180 (1912); State v. James, 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657 (1890).
26. 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original). Although the decision in Wither-
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Since the decision in Witherspoon, the Supreme Court has
refined and extended the initial standard. In Boulden v.
Holman27 and Maxwell v. Bishop,28 the Court reversed state
death sentences because the records demonstrated the trial
courts' lack of caution in making absolutely sure that jurors excluded for cause were irrevocably opposed to the death penalty.
In Davis v. Georgia,2 the Court moved a step further, holding
that the Witherspoon test is violated by the exclusion of even
one potential juror who is not irrevocably opposed to the death
penalty. In addition, the Court implied that this rationale would
apply when the prosecution had not exhausted its peremptory
challenges and would presumably have struck an erroneously excused juror if the trial court had not done so for cause.30 Lockett

spoon was based on the Court's conclusion that the jury was impermissibly biased
against the petitioner on the issue of his punishment, the Court also discussed the petitioner's argument that the exclusion of jurors because of scruples or objections to capital
punishment created a jury that was unconstitutionally biased on the issue of guilt. If the
Court had found Witherspoon's argument convincing, such a conclusion would have
mandated the reversal of the petitioner's conviction as well as his sentence. Witherspoon's argument failed to convince the Court largely because of the preliminary nature
of the data he presented. The Court stated that the petitioner's data were "too tentative
and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor
the prosecution in their determination of guilt." Id. at 517 (footnote omitted). However,
the Court made a point of stating that it was not ruling that a petitioner may never he
able to establish "that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in
*. . [a] jury [that is less than neutral] on the issue of guilt or [that] substantially increases the risk of conviction." Id. at 518.
Since the ruling in Witherspoon, a number of studies have produced data tending to
show that "death-qualified juries," even when qualified by the Witherspoon standard,
which allows exclusion only for a substantial opposition to the death penalty, are biased
in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt. See, e.g., Bronson, On the Conviction
Pronenessand Representativeness of the Death-QualifiedJury: An Empirical Study of
Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLo. L. Rxv. 1 (1970); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of
Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of PsychologicalData to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 53 (1970); Jurow, New Data on the
Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt DeterminationProcess, 84 HAav. L.
REv. 567 (1971); White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by
Death-QualifiedJuries, 58 CoRNFi L. Rnv. 1176 (1973). An excellent summary of a
number of studies dealing with the effect of "death qualification" on the tendency of a
jury to convict or acquit can be found in Hovey v. Superior Court, - Cal. 3d -, 616
P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
27. 394 U.S. 478 (1969).
28. 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
29. 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
30. See id. at 124 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Before Davis, the Supreme Court summarily reversed a number of state court decisions for failure to meet the standards of
Witherspoon. Several of these state courts had held that exclusion of a few potential
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v. Ohios1 is the only decision in which the Court has upheld a
state court decision challenged on the basis of Witherspoon.
While Boulden, Maxwell, and Davis considered the constitutionality of excluding jurors because of their inability to vote for a
sentence of death, the Court in Lockett considered the constitutionality of exclusion for inability to be impartial on the issue of
guilt. It held that jurors cannot properly be excluded unless they
state unequivocally that their attitude toward capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision
about the defendant's guilt. 2 The Court's most recent application of the Witherspoon test appears in Adams v. Texas.3 3 In
Adams, the Court held that the Witherspoon standard precluded the exclusion of jurors even if they conceded that their
opposition to the death penalty would affect "their honest judgment of the facts ' 34 or their determination of reasonable
35

doubt.

2. South Carolina's Application of Witherspoon.-Of the
six South Carolina decisions in which the supreme court has
considered the application of the Witherspoon standard,36 two

jurors in violation of the Witherspoon standard did not constitute reversible error as
long as there was no systematic exclusion of jurors. E.g., State v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245
A.2d 20 (1968), rev'd, 403 U.S. 946 (1971); State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St. 2d 171, 248
N.E.2d 607 (1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d
558 (1969), reu'd,403 U.S. 947 (1971). Several state courts also found no prejudicial error
in the improper exclusion of jurors at a point when the prosecution still possessed preemptory challenges. E.g., State v. Wigglesworth, State v. Mathis.
31. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
32. 438 U.S. at 596; 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
33. 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980). The issue in Adams was whether the Witherspoon test
applied to a state capital proceeding in which the jurors' discretion was limited by the
requirement that they answer three questions concerning the defendant and the nature
of the crime:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;, and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id. at 2524. If a jury answers all of these questions affirmatively beyond a reasonable
doubt, the trial judge is required to impose a sentence of death.
34. Id. at 2529.
35. Id.
36. The decisions other than Goolsby are State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d
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do not appear to comport with the test set forth in that case and
its progeny. Goolsby is one of these and is inconsistent with
Witherspoon in two respects. First, the Witherspoon standard
provides that no juror may be excluded unless it is "unmistakeably clear '3 7 that he is either irrevocably opposed to capital
punishment or unable to be impartial on the issue of guilt.38 The

trial court in Goolsby excluded at least one potential juror on
the basis of inconsistent responses to its arguably confusing
questions.39 Thus, the trial court did not meet the requisite standard of care. Second, Witherspoon and its progeny make it evident that the constitutional standard governing exclusion of potential jurors because of their beliefs concerning capital
punishment merely limits the states' ability to exclude jurors
and does not mandate the exclusion of jurors for any reason.
Whether or not a state chooses to exclude jurors who may constitutionally be excluded under Witherspoon is purely a matter
of state law. 40 Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court
554 (1979); State v. Neeley, 271 S.C. 33, 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978); State v. Hicks, 257 S.C.
279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971); Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 491, 186 S.E.2d 516 (1970); State
v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970).
37. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
38. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
39. An example of the effect of the trial court's questioning can be found in the
examination of the potential juror Bowie. In response to the judge's questions concerning
her opposition to capital punishment, Bowie stated that although she was unsure, she
did not think she would be opposed to capital punishment in all cases. The following
exchange then took place:
THE COURT. All right. Notwithstanding your opposition to capital punishment in some degree, would such belief or attitude on your part render you
unable to return a verdict of guilty according to law?
A. I think it possibly could, yes, sir.
THE COURT. Remembering, of course, that we're talking about, now, two trials-one to determine guilt, or innocence; the other to determine punishment.
Would your feeling in regard to being against capital punishment render you
unable to return a verdict of guilty according to the law?
A. Yes, sir.
Record, vol. 1, at 464-65. In light of the potential juror's initial response that she would
not be opposed to the death penalty in all cases, it appears likely that her response to
the next question resulted from the confusing nature of the questions asked. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that defense counsel interrupted the judge's
questioning with a request for an explanation of "return a verdict of guilty according to
law." The judge refused and excluded the juror for cause. Id. Similar examples of the
effect of the judge's questioning can be found in the Record, vol. 1, at 278, 288.
40. After the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Goolsby, the United
States Supreme Court decided Adams, 100 S.Ct. 2521, in which the Court explicitly
stated that Witherspoon did not mandate the exclusion of jurors for any reason. For
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concluded that Witherspoon mandates the exclusion of jurors
who are either irrevocably opposed to capital punishment or unable to be impartial on the issue of guilt.41
3. South Carolina's Jury Selection Statute.-The South
Carolina statute42 governing the extent to which jurors can be
excluded because of their beliefs about capital punishment
places a stricter limit on the exclusion of jurors than does the
federal constitutional standard of Witherspoon. Section 16-320(E) of the South Carolina Code 43 expressly states that a juror
may not be excluded for cause "unless [his] beliefs or attitudes
[against capital punishment] would render him unable to return
a verdict of guilty according to the law."' 44 The statute apparently permits a juror to serve in a capital trial even though he
admittedly would not vote for imposition of the death penalty,
as long as his beliefs would not prevent his finding the defendant guilty. 45 The statute thus omits one aspect of the Wither-

spoon standard: constitutionally permissible exclusion upon a
declaration of inability to vote for the death penalty in any
circumstance. 6
The South Carolina Supreme Court's discussion of the statute in Goolsby ignored the statute's omission of part of the
additional discussion of Adams, see notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
41. The court described the following situation as appropriate for the exclusion of a
potential juror: "[W]hen such a belief prevents the potential juror from rendering an
impartial decision as to the guilt or innocence of the accused or to vote for the death
penalty under any circumstances, such irrevocable commitment mandates excluding the
venireman." - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 35.
42. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-20(E)(Supp. 1980). The statute provides as follows:
In every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime
which may be punishable by death a person may not be disqualified, excused,
or excluded from service as a juror therein by reason of his beliefs or attitudes
against capital punishment unless such beliefs or attitudes would render him
unable to return a verdict of guilty according to law.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The statute's legislative history offers further insight into its meaning. The legislator who introduced the statute chose between alternative drafts provided by the American Civil Liberties Union. The draft not chosen would have permitted disqualification of
a potential juror for either (1) inability to find a defendant guilty of a capital crime or (2)
inability to vote for a sentence of death. The legislature's adoption of S.C. CODE ANN
§ 16-3-20(E) indicates that it intended to permit a person to serve as a juror despite his
inability to vote for a penalty of death under any circumstances. See, Brief of Legislative
Amici Curiae at 5, State v. Linder, State v. Hyman (appeals pending, S.C. Sup. Ct.);
Brief of Appellant at 6-7, 75-80, State v. Linder (appeals pending, S.C. Sup. Ct.).
46. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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Witherspoon standard. The court noted only that the lower
court's questioning of potential jurors was an attempt to carry
out the directives of the statute, 7 and its discussion concluded
with the statement that potential jurors were excluded only because of their "inability to faithfully carry out their duties as
jurors under the law."48 Although these statements might indicate that the exclusion of potential jurors in Goolsby met the
requirements of the statute, this treatment fails to define the
exact requirements of the statute. The court should resolve the
question of whether the statute requires a standard of jury exclusion stricter than the standard established by Witherspoon.
Its continued failure to address this issue creates a risk of frustrating the legislative purpose underlying the statute. '1
II.

WAIVER OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM

Both the South Carolina Supreme Court49 and the United
States Supreme Court" have held that jeopardy attaches on a
criminal charge as soon as a jury is impaneled and sworn or, at a
trial without jury, when the first witness is sworn. Once jeopardy
has attached on a charge, the trial must continue until a verdict
is reached unless some "manifest necessity" for declaring a mistrial appears.5 1 In Kelly v. State,52 the South Carolina Supreme
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(E) (Supp. 1980). See note 42 supra.
48. S.C. at , 268 S.E.2d at 35.
48.1. The South Carolina Supreme Court has since ruled, in State v. Linder, No.
21452 (S.C., fied May 14, 1981), that § 16-3-20(E) permits the exclusion of any juror who
could be excluded under the Witherspoon test: the trial judge did not err "by disqualifying prospective jurors from the jury panel who were absolutely opposed to capital punishment under any circumstance."
49. State v. Charles, 183 S.C. 188, 190 S.E. 466 (1937); State v. Richardson, 47 S.C.
166, 25 S.E. 220 (1896); State v. McKee, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 651 (1830). Since the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 2056 (1969), holding that the protection of the federal constitution against double jeopardy applies to the
states, South Carolina has been forced to adopt the federal rule determining when jeopardy attaches. This forced adoption, however, has not changed South Carolina law, because the rule in South Carolina was identical to the federal rule before Benton v.
Maryland.
50. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
51. The requirement of "manifest necessity" is strictly applied only when the defendant opposes the declaration of a mistrial. If the defendant moves for a mistrial or consents to a mistrial, he is held to have waived his right to claim double jeopardy on retrial.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what constitutes manifest
necessity on several occasions. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Illinois v.
Summerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v.
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Court held that a defendant's "counseled plea of guilty, knowingly and intelligently entered pursuant to a favorable plea bargain," to a charge that clearly places him twice in jeopardy
waives his right to assert a later claim of double jeopardy. 53
The defendant in Kelly was charged with armed robbery,
grand larceny, and robbery. Although the other charges were not
dismissed, the trial court proceeded on the armed robbery
charge, and defendant was acquitted." The following day, defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny pursuant to a plea bargain, in which the solicitor agreed to drop other unrelated
charges, and received the maximum sentence of ten years. The
grand larceny charge had been included in the original indictment and arose out of the same circumstances as the armed robbery charge of which he had been acquitted. 55 Defendant later
filed an application for postconviction relief arguing that the
grand larceny charge to which he had pleaded guilty violated the
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and South Carolina

United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
62. - S.C. -, 266 S.E.2d 417 (1980).
53. .S.C. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 418. In addition to the theory relied upon by the
court, defendant argued that his prosecution on a grand larceny charge placed him twice
in jeopardy because he already had been tried and acquitted on a charge of armed robbery, of which grand larceny is a lesser included offense. Brief of Appellant at 9-12. The
problem of determining whether offenses are separate or the same is not always easy to
resolve. As noted by both defendant and the state, the test for determining whether
charges are separate under South Carolina law is different from the test that has been
applied by the United States Supreme Court. Brief of Appellant at 9-11; Brief of Respondent at 3-6. The rule in South Carolina is that a second charge constitutes double
jeopardy only if the evidence necessary to establish a conviction under the second charge
would have been sufficient to establish a conviction under the first. E.g., State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 466, 186 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1972); State v. Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 589,
59 S.E.2d 168, 173, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850, rehearingdenied, 340 U.S. 894 (1950). In
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the federal rule is stated as follows:
"[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one
is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
Id. at 304. Although the defendant in Kelly urged that Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977), required the application of the federal standard rather than the South Carolina
standard, Brief of Appellant at 11-13, the South Carolina Supreme Court sidestepped
that question and held that defendant had been placed in double jeopardy through the
use of one indictment that included all three charges. _-S.C. at , 266 S.E.2d at 418.
54. Record at 102.
55. Id. at 67, 68, 71, 102-03. The charges of armed robbery, robbery, and grand larceny all arose out of the robbery of a liquor store in which approximately $1,000 was
taken.
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Constitutions.5 6 The trial court denied relief, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. 57 The supreme court found that
defendant's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy had been
violated by the opportunity given him to plead guilty to the
grand larceny charge, but the issue of whether he had waived his
right to assert double jeopardy by entering a guilty plea
presented a closer question. In its determination that defendant
had waived his right, the court relied solely on the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v.
Maryland.58
In Brown, the Fourth Circuit held that a guilty plea entered
voluntarily and intelligently as a result of a favorable plea bargain waived a claim of double jeopardy,59 basing its conclusion
on the rationale developed by the United States Supreme Court
in Brady v. United States,60 McMann v. Richardson,61 Parker v.
North Carolina62 and Tollett v. Henderson." This line of cases
supports a general rule, observed by state and federal courts,
that a voluntary and knowing plea of guilty entered with the
advice of counsel waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including
claims of violations of constitutional rights before the plea." A
defendant, after entering a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea,
may not raise claims relating to prior deprivation of constitutional rights; 5 he may attack only the voluntary and intelligent
nature of the guilty plea.66 Significantly, however, no defendant
invoked the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy in any

56. S.C. at 266 S.E.2d at 418. The constitutional proscriptions of double
jeopardy are found in U.S. CONST. amend. V and S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
57. S.C. at , 266 S.E.2d at 417.
58. 618 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1980).
59. 618 F.2d at 1058.
60. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
61. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
62. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
63. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Wray, 608 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1979); Stanley v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. United States, 589 F.2d 192 (5th Cir.
1979); Camp v. United States, 487 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rodriguez,
444 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977); Rivers v. Strickland, 264 S.C. 121, 213 S.E.2d 97
(1975); State v. Fuller, 254 S.C. 260, 174 S.E.2d 774 (1970).
65. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758; McMann, 397 U.S. at 769-71; Parker,397 U.S. at 796-99;
Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-69.
66. See 411 U.S. at 267.
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of the four cases relied on by the Fourth Circuit in Brown."
In Menna v. New York, e8 a decision inexplicably ignored by
the Fourth Circuit in Brown, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a voluntary and intelligent guilty
plea automatically waives a claim of double jeopardy. In Menna,
the Court held that a defendant's plea of guilty to a charge related to one for which he had already been sentenced had not
waived his double jeopardy claim that "the charge [was] one
which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."6 The
Court in Menna stated that Brady, McMann, and Tollett cannot be interpreted to mean that "counseled guilty pleas inevitably 'waive' all antecedent constitutional violations" and further
explained that
[t]he point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of guilt from the
case.... A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant
those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with
the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand
in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.
Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.
The guilty plea, therefore does not bar the claim.70
The United States Supreme Court in Menna did not ascertain whether it was impossible to waive a double jeopardy
claim.7 1 The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, considered this question in Kelly. Without citing authority, the court
reasoned that a guilty plea entered as a result of a favorable plea
bargain waived a claim of double jeopardy because of the benefit
received by the defendant and the prosecutorial concessions in67. In Brady, petitioners attacked their guilty pleas by arguing that the pleas were
induced by fear of possible death sentences that were statutorily permissible upon recommendation by a jury. 397 U.S. at 744. In McMann and Parker,petitioners argued that
their pleas were the result of earlier coerced confessions and therefore were involuntary.
397 U.S. at 762; 397 U.S. at 794. In Parker and Tollett, petitioners argued that their
indictments were invalidated by the systematic exclusion of blacks from their respective
grand juries. 397 U.S. at 794; 411 U.S. at 254.
68. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
69. Id. at 62 n.2.
70. Id. (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
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duced by the defendant's agreement to plead guilty. The Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, in cases
interpreting Menna, have ruled that guilty pleas entered as a
result of favorable plea bargaining do not waive claims of double
jeopardy.7 2 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that,
"[s]ince most guilty pleas are the product of plea bargaining, an
exception permitting . . . waiver of double jeopardy through

bargaining would swallow the general rule established in
Menna."7 3
Although Menna does not rule out the possibility that a
guilty plea may constitute waiver of a double jeopardy claim
under some circumstances,7 4 it is highly questionable whether
the added fact of a favorable plea bargaining agreement is sufficient to constitute waiver. Because the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Kelly relied on Brown and because Brown is questionable authority for the proposition that a counseled guilty plea
waives a claim of double jeopardy, the South Carolina court
should seize the first opportunity to reexamine its decision in
Kelly in the light of Menna and the decisions of lower courts
that have followed Menna.
III.

MISPRISION OF A FELONY

The English common-law crime of misprision of a felony became a part of South Carolina law pursuant to the state's recep75
tion statute, section 14-1-50 of the South Carolina Code. Proof

of the crime at common law required the establishment of two
elements: (1) that the accused had "facts and information before
him" that would lead "a reasonable man in his place" to know
"that a serious offense had been committed"78 and (2) that the

72. Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978); Moroyoqui v. United
States, 570 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1978); Green v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. 575 F.2d at 772.
74. See generally Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770. The Ninth Circuit in
Launius states in dicta that a double jeopardy claim may be waived by the waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)("the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (1976) provides: "All, and every part, of the common
law of England, where it is not altered by the Code or inconsistent with the Constitution

or laws of this State, is hereby continued in full force and effect in the same manner as
before the adoption of this section."
76. Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528, 563 (1961).
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accused failed to disclose the facts known to him to the proper
authorities. 7" In State v. Carson,78 the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that, despite a long history of disuse and notwithstanding the total lack of precedent for prosecution of the offense in this state, misprision remains a crime in South Carolina. 79 The court then explained in dictum that a defendant's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may bar prosecution for misprision "only when the statements concealed
would incriminate the defendant as an accessory or principal in
the protected felony." 80
The defendant in Carson witnessed a murder and left the
scene shortly before police arrived. When questioned later, he
denied having been a witness. Subsequently, he was arrested and
charged with conspiracy, murder, attempted armed robbery, and
misprision of a felony and was tried and convicted of misprision."' On appeal, he argued against the recognition of misprision on the grounds that the offense had been dormant for a
long period and that no South Carolina precedent for its prosecution existed. Defendant further contended that the crime of
misprision, by its very nature, conflicts with the privilege against
self-incrimination contained in the United States and South
82
Carolina Constitutions.
The South Carolina Supreme Court began by applying the
following definition of misprision of a felony: "It is described as
a criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being committed or to bring the offender to justice after its commission, but
without such previous concert with, or subsequent assistance of
him as will make the concealer an accessory before or after the
fact." 88 The court then rejected defendant's arguments, noting

77. Id. The crime did not require active concealment, and it was not a crime to fail
to report facts concerning a misdemeanor. Id.

78. 274 S.C. 316, 262 S.E.2d 918 (1980).
79. Id. at 318, 262 S.E.2d at 918.
80. Id. at 319, 262 S.E.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Trigilio, 255 F.2d 385 (2d
Cir. 1958); United States v. Pittman, 527 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
923 (1976); United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976)).
81. The maximum penalty in South Carolina for misprision is ten years' imprisonment. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-20, -30; State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 175 S.E.2d 227
(1970).
82. Brief of Appellant at 3-7. The privileges against self-incrimination are found in
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V and S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.
83. 274 S.C. at 318, 262 S.E.2d at 920 (citing 15 C.J.S. Compounding Offenses
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that the common law can be changed only by "clear and unambiguous legislative enactment," not by implication through years
of nonuse." Further, the court found no conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination because the defendant was
"neither a principal nor an accessory before or after the fact, but
merely a witness who concealed valuable information from the
investigating officers." 85
The total absence of precedent in South Carolina for the
prosecution of misprision leaves the scope of the crime undefined. Until the supreme court offers further definition, the sta-

§ 2(2)(1955); BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 902 (5th ed. 1979)).
84. Id. at 319, 262 S.E.2d at 920. The court's conclusion that the common law can be
changed only by clear legislative enactment is open to question. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-150 (1976) leaves room for the alteration of any common law that is "inconsistent with the
* . .laws of this state." Id. Further, a very early South Carolina decision states that the
courts are bound by the "reception" statute to adopt English common law only to the
extent that it is applicable to South Carolina's own conditions and circumstances. Lester
v. Frazier, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 529 (1837). This holding is supported by several more
recent decisions from other states. See Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); People v. Lefkovitz, 249
Mich. 263, 293 N.W. 642 (1940).
In support of its position that the common law can be changed only by clear legislative enactment, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited the following South Carolina
cases decided after Lester v. Frazier:Coakley v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 194 S.C. 284, 9
S.E.2d 724 (1940); Nuckolls v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 5 S.E.2d 862
(1939). Although these'later South Carolina decisions are unquestionably more persuasive than Lester and the decisions of other jurisdictions, Lester nevertheless establishes
that the court is not conclusively bound to await legislative changes in the common law.
85. 274 S.C. at 320, 262 S.E.2d at 920. The standard for determining whether a particular statement or testimony violates the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was stated in United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968):
The privilege guaranteed by the fifth amendment not only extends to statements that would in themselves support a conviction but likewise embraces
those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
the individual for a crime provided such individual has reasonable cause to
fear he might thereby be convicted of that crime. Id. at 697. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); United States v. Trigilio, 255 F.2d 385
(2d Cir. 1958); State v. Conquest, 152 N.J. Super. 382, 377 A.2d 1234 (1977).
Although the above standard is fairly liberal and has been held by a number of courts to
bar a prosecution for misprision, each case, where the privilege against self-incrimination
has been held to be an adequate defense to misprision has contained evidence providing
a direct link between the defendant and the crime for which the government sought the
defendant's testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Conquest, 152 N.J. Super.
832, 377 A.2d 1239 (1977). The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Carson
appears to be consistent with these cases. Outside of the defendant's presence at the
scene of the crime, there was no evidence connecting him with the murder or attempted
armed robbery.
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tus of the offense in other jurisdictions provides the only guidance. Three states and the federal government have made

explicit statutory provision for misprision,"' and each has limited the broad scope of the common-law offense. One such
state87 and the federal government 8 require activ e concealment
of knowledge of a crime rather than mere failure to report it.
Another state only imposes a duty to report felonies involving
violence or the threat of violence when the commission of a
crime or preparation for its commission is witnessed. 9 The third
imposes a duty to report any felony but recognizes exemptions
from that duty in connection with a long list of privileges.9 0
Three other states have recognized misprision through deci-

sional law.l Two of these have not attempted to limit the scope
of the common-law crime.

2

The third, however, limits mispri-

86. The federal statute is found at 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The three states with statutory misprision are New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:97-2 (West
1969); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (Page Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
9.69.100 (1977).
87. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A97-2 (West 1969). But see State v. Hann, 40 N.J.L. 229
(Sup. Ct. 1878). In State v. Hann, the New Jersey court held that actual concealment
was not required and upheld a defendant's conviction for misprision for simply failing to
report that he witnessed a murder. Hann, however, was decided long before the series of
federal cases requiring actual concealment for conviction of the federal crime of misprision. See note 91 infra. Because the New Jersey statute is very similar to the federal
statute, the New Jersey court may follow the lead of federal courts by requiring actual
concealment for a misprision conviction. See Comment, Misprision of a Felony: A Reappraisal,23 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1108 nn.73 & 74 (1974).
88. See, e.g., United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1968); Lancey v.
United States, 356 F.2d 407, 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1966); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d
643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939).
89. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (1977).
90. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(E) (Page Supp. 1980). The privileges listed
in the statute are as follows: (1) traditional privileges existing between professionals and
their clients, e.g., attorney/client, doctor/patient, clergyman/church member; (2) privilege between husband and wife; (3) privilege between the defendant and a member of the
defendant's immediate family; (4) privilege between a news reporter and his source; (5)
privilege between a person working in a drug treatment program and a patient; and (6)
privilege between a counselor and the victim of a crime who is participating in a bona
fide victim counseling program.
91. The courts of Delaware, Rhode Island, and Vermont have expressly recognized
misprision. See State v. Biddle, 32 Del. 401, 124 A. 804 (1923); State v. Flynn, 100 R.L
520, 217 A.2d 432 (1966); State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
92. See State v. Biddle, 32 DeL 401, 124 A. 804 (1923); State v. Flynn, 100 R.L 520,
217 A.2d 432 (1966). Biddle, the most recent Delaware decision dealing with misprision,
was decided almost sixty years ago. Should the question arise again, the Delaware court
may follow the lead of courts in Florida, Maryland, and Michigan and abolish the crime.
See Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Pope v. State, 284
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sion to circumstances in which failure to report a felony is motivated by "evil intent."93
Most jurisdictions that recognize misprision have limited
the broad scope that the crime had at common law. -InMarbury
v. Brooks," an 1822 decision by the United States Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Marshall aptly described what remains perhaps the foremost reason for the limitation of misprision: "It
may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law
which would punish him in every case, for not performing this
duty, is too harsh for man."9' 5 Although at one time in the history of our country, the maintenance of law and order may have
required enforcement of common-law misprision as a method of
securing the cooperation of citizens in the law enforcement effort,98 the common-law duty to report all felonies can easily become intolerable in a society in which significant segments of the
population may oppose certain laws.97 "While it may still be desirable, even essential, that we encourage citizens to 'get involved' to help reduce crime," citizens should not be held criminally liable for mere failure to report their knowledge of a
crime. 8 If the issue is properly raised, the South Carolina Supreme Court should expressly limit the application of misprision
by adopting any or all of the methods employed by other
jurisdictions.
IV.

WARRANTLESS ARREST FOR MISDEMEANOR

Section 17-13-30 of the South Carolina Code gives sheriffs
and deputy sheriffs the authority to arrest without a warrant
any person who violates a law within their view." As this section
Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); People v. Lefkovitz, 294 Mich. 263, 265, 293 N.W. 642,
643 (1940).
93. State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. at 254, 67 A. at 534.
94. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556 (1822).

95. Id. at 575-76.
96. See Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d at 809; Note, Misprisionof a Felony, 6 S.C.L.Q.
87, 95 (1953).
97. See Comment, Misprision:A Reappraisal,supra note 87, at 1111. The author

offers the prohibition legislation and current marijuana laws as examples of legislation to
which large segments of the population have been and presently are opposed. Id.
98. Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d at 810.
99. S.C. CoD. ANN. § 17-13-30 (1976) provides that sheriffs "may arrest without
warrant any and all persons who, within their view, violate any of the criminal laws of
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intimates, the general rule in South Carolina is that law enforcement officers may not arrest without a warrant a person who
commits a misdemeanor outside their view. 100 Section 23-13-60
of the South Carolina Code, however, permits deputy sheriffs to
make a warrantless arrest for any suspected freshly committed
crime, whether upon sight or upon prompt information or complaint. 101 Section 23-5-40 of the South Carolina Code makes the
foregoing statutes applicable to highway patrolmen. 0 2 In State
v. Martin,10 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that these
statutes authorize a highway patrolman to make a warrantless
arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence !'when
the facts and circumstances observed by the officer give him
probable cause to believe that a crime has been freshly committed.

' 10 4

This holding, while not inconsistent with holdings in

earlier cases, clearly broadens the circumstances in which an officer may make a warrantless arrest.
In Martin, a highway patrolman, upon arriving at the scene
of an automobile accident, found skid marks on the highway and
two damaged cars, each bearing paint flecks that corresponded
to the color of the other. Defendant admitted being the driver of
one of the cars, and, because he appeared highly intoxicated, the
patrolman arrested him on a charge of operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of intoxicants. Defendant then voluntarily
took a breathalyzer test, which showed a percentage of alcohol in
this State if such arrest be made at the time of such violation of law or immediately
thereafter."
100. See note 113 and accompanying text infra.
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-13-60 (1976) provides, "The deputy sheriffs may for any
suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or
complaint, arrest without warrant and, in pursuit of the criminal or suspected criminal,
enter houses or break and enter them, whether in their own county or in an adjoining
county."
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-5-40 (1976) provides:
The patrolmen and officers of the South Carolina Highway Patrol shall patrol
the highways of the State for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the State
relative to highway traffic and motor vehicles. Such officers and patrolmen
shall have the same power to serve criminal processes against offenders as
sheriffs of the various counties and also the same power as such sheriffs to
arrest without warrants and to detain persons found violating or attempting to
violate any laws of the State relative to highway traffic and motor vehicles.
Such officers and patrolmen shall also have the same power and authority held
by deputy sheriffs for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State.
103.

-

S.C.

104. Id. at

-,

-,

268 S.E.2d 105 (1980).

268 S.E.2d at 107.
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his blood sufficient to create a presumption of intoxication."0 5 At
defendant's trial, the results of the breathalyzer test were admitted in evidence over his objection, and he was convicted. The
trial court, however, granted defendant's motion for a new trial,
finding his arrest illegal and the results of the breathalyzer test
therefore inadmissible. 10 6
The supreme court overturned the trial court's decision and,
relying on sections 17-13-30, 23-13-60, and 23-5-40, determined
that defendant's arrest had been legal. The court explained that
the facts observed by the officer at the scene of the accident
compelled him to draw the conclusion that a crime had been
freshly committed and reasoned that the arrest was necessary to
prevent the further commission of a crime: defendant's driving
from the scene while still intoxicated. 10 7 The court found support for this rationale in State v. Simss and State v. Mims.10 9
In Sims, the court created an exception to the general rule on
warrantless arrests110 by declaring valid an arrest made by an
officer who arrived at the scene of a public disturbance after
peace had been restored. The court explained that the necessity
for peace officers to preserve law and order and to prevent further disturbance and the possible commission of a felony rendered the arrest proper. 1 In Mires, the court ruled that a crime
is committed in the presence of an officer "when the facts and
circumstances occurring within his observation, in connection
with what, under the circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to believe" that a crime

105. The statutory presumptions arising from different percentages of alcohol in the
blood can be found at S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(b)(1), (2), (3)(1976).

106. Record at 131, 132. The trial court's decision to exclude the results of the
breathalyzer test was apparently influenced by its finding that defendant was illegally
arrested. Record at 131, 132. The supreme court has thus far not indicated whether it
will exclude evidence obtained as a result of an arrest that is illegal but nevertheless
constitutional. The arrest in Martin, based on sufficient probable cause, was clearly
constitutional.
107.

-

S.C. at

-,

268 S.E.2d at 107.

108. 16 S.C. 486 (1881).
109. 263 S.C. 45, 208 S.E.2d 288 (1974).
110. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
111. 16 S.C. at 494. Percival v. Bailey, 70 S.C. 72, 49 S.E. 7 (1904), recognized Sims
as an exception to the general misdemeanor arrest rule, which it applied in emergency
situations in which "the officer arrived at the place of the disturbance very soon after the
offense and found the offender present." Id. at 74, 49 S.E. at 7.
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has been committed.112
Although the court attempted to fit Martin into the mold of
its earlier cases, the decision considerably broadens its interpretation of the requirement that an offense be committed in an
officer's "presence" in order to justify a warrantless arrest. With
the exception of Sims, all prior South Carolina decisions require

that an offense occur in the officer's presence if a warrantless
arrest is to be valid.118 In Martin, however, the court validated a
warrantless arrest on facts observed by the officer after the offense had been committed.
A minority of other jurisdictions, in reasoned decisions,
have similarly construed the requirement that an offense be
committed in the officer's presence.114 Implicit in these decisions
is the conclusion that probable cause may reasonably exist in an
officer's mind even though he was not present at the scene of the
crime at the time the offense took place. Moreover, most decisions construe the presence requirement broadly, as did the

South Carolina Supreme Court in Martin, to include situations
in which an officer can deduce probable cause from physical evidence observed at the scene. 15 These decisions appear to provide adequate safeguards for preventing unreasonable arrests.
Nevertheless, to ensure the preservation of such safeguards,
112. 263 S.C. at 49, 208 S.E.2d at 289 (quoting State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 259,
116 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1960)). In Mires, an officer summoned to a residence on a breach of
peace call had knowledge before he arrived that the appellant was creating a disturbance. When he arrived, he heard scuffling and arguing sufficient to create probable
cause in his mind that a misdemeanor was being committed. 263 SC. at 46, 208 S.E.2d at
289.
113. E.g., State v. Mines, 263 S.C. 45, 208 S.E.2d 288 (1974); State v. Williams, 237
S.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 858 (1960); Yongue v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 190 S.C. 421, 3 S.E.2d 198
(1939); Percival v. Bailey, 70 S.C. 72, 49 S.E. 7 (1904); State v. Williams, 36 S.C. 493, 15
S.E. 554 (1892). Compare State v. Young, 243 S.C. 187, 133 S.E.2d 210 (1963), with Prosser v. Parsons, 245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
114. See, e.g., Freeman v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 70 Cal. 2d 235, 449 P.2d 195, 74
Cal. Rptr. 259 (1969); McDonald v. Justice Court, Yuba City Jud. Dist., 249 Cal. App. 2d
960, 58 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1967); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970); State v. Morse,
54 N.J. 32, 252 A.2d 723 (1969); State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 325 A.2d 353
(1974).
115. Arrests have been upheld on the basis of a defendant's admission that he had
been driving a nearby car, State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970); a defendant's
presence in a car at the scene of an accident combined with his intoxication, McDonald
v. Justice Court, Yuba City Jud. Dist., 249 Cal. App. 2d 960, 58 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1967); and
other similar circumstances, e.g., State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 325 A.2d 353
(1974).
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courts must strictly require the officer's arrival at the scene very
shortly after the commission of the crime and easily observable
physical evidence that strongly indicates the fresh commission of
a misdemeanor. Adherence to this standard adequately replaces
the requirement of an officer's presence during the commission
of a misdemeanor for a valid warrantless arrest. 116
John H. Hare

116. Despite this conclusion, the majority of jurisdictions still require the presence
of an officer during the commission of the offense for a valid warrantless arrest. See, e.g.,
State v. Nixon, 102 Ariz. 20, 423 P.2d 718 (1967); Perkins v. Little Rock, 232 Ark. 739,
339 S.W.2d 859 (1960); People v. Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974); State
v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973). A number of courts have minimized the
effect of the requirement, however, by refusing to exclude evidence obtained as a result
of warrantless arrests in which the officer was not present at the time the offense took
place. In these jurisdictions, a defendant's only remedy is a civil suit against the arresting officer. See, e.g., Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W.2d 358; Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556,
196 S.E.2d 706.
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